Geotechnical uncertainty may be the most difficult risk to manage in construction. In Design-10 Build (DB), where the project's price is fixed before design and in many cases the subsurface 11 investigation is complete, the risk profile is fundamentally changed and the owner must address 12
INTRODUCTION 29
A thorough geotechnical investigation is typically conducted as part of a transportation project's 30 design process, and it is common practice to prepare a geotechnical design report (GDR) for use 31 in designing subsurface project features such as foundations (WSDOT 2004) . The tunneling 32 industry takes the subsurface investigation and analysis to a more detailed level by developing a 33 geotechnical baseline report (GBR) to act as a benchmark against which potential differing site 34 conditions can be compared. It also permits a more equitable sharing of the risk associated with 35 subsurface uncertainty with its contracting community, which is intended to reduce risk-36 associated contingencies in the bidding process (Dwyre et al. 2010 ). Regardless of the amount of 37 sampling, testing and analysis that occurs prior to completing a project's design, the project's 38 owner may still find itself liable for differing site conditions found after construction has 39 commenced, making geotechnical risk management a difficult aspect for projects delivered using 40 traditional design-bid-build (DBB) (Christensen and Meeker 2002) . The geotechnical risk profile 41 changes in design-build (DB) project delivery in a manner that potentially drives project success. 42
A DBB project's design is finished before advertising the construction contract, but the design-43 builder completes both the design and the construction under a single contract in DB. As such, 44 DB project delivery may involve the possibility that the subsurface geotechnical investigation 45 will be undertaken by the DB contractor after executing a fixed price contract. That factor begs 46 the question: how much investigation, if any, should the owner do prior to advertising the DB contract to characterize the geotechnical conditions upon which competing design-build teams 48 will base their proposed price? 49
50
The highway construction industry is a somewhat late entrant into the use of DB project delivery. 51
While public agencies have used it to some degree on vertical projects for at least four decades, it 52 wasn't until the Utah Department of Transportation turned to DB as the only way to accelerate 53 the highway construction required for the 2002 Winter Olympics that the industry saw it as a 54 potential procurement tool (FHWA 2006) . A major reason for not using DB until recently relates 55 to the relative physical scales of building projects and highway projects. In building construction 56 contracts, the probability that differing subsurface conditions will impact an architectural project 57 is essentially limited to the building's footprint. However, a highway project's footprint is not 58 only larger in area but also linear in shape, which greatly increases the probability that a differing 59 site condition will be encountered. Add to that the fact that many public utilities are installed in 60 the right of way of the nation's roads and the likelihood that the owner will be exposed to a 61 serious differing site conditions claim greatly increases (Lee et al. 2015) . 62
According to a study completed by FHWA, public transportation agencies tend to reserve DB 63 delivery for projects that must conform to an accelerated schedule (FHWA 2006) . This shortens 64 the time available for both the owner and the successful DB team to conduct the subsurface 65 investigations/analyses needed to quantify and mitigate the DB project's geotechnical risk. 66
Additionally, the DB contractor is typically obligated to establish a firm fixed price during the 67 bidding process before the design is complete and often before any new subsurface 68
Final approved manuscript. Published as: Lopez del Puerto, C., Gransberg, D.D., and Loulakis, M.C., "Contractual Approaches To Address Geotechnical Uncertainty In Design-Build Projects," investigations have been undertaken. This forces the design-builder to include contingencies for 69 the risk that the geotechnical design assumptions that were made during the bidding process turn 70 out to be wrong. Those contingencies are paid by the owner whether or not they are actually 71 realized due to the nature of a lump sum construction contract (McLain et al. 2014) . 72 73 Additionally, the very physical nature of how a highway project is built adds fuel to the 74 subsurface uncertainty fire because the subsurface construction activities are the first features of 75 work that must be constructed, making them also the first technical features whose design must 76 be completed (Gransberg and Gad 2014) . This issue becomes especially acute when there is a 77 need to release early design work packages for construction before the entire design has been 78 finished. The result is an enormous pressure for the owner's geotechnical engineers to truncate 79 the traditional pre-award subsurface investigation, analysis, and design process to support the 80 accelerated completion of the entire project. 81
An additional issue that the agency must also address is the contracting policy question of how 82 much information should be provided to competing DB teams regarding the character of the 83 geotechnical site conditions in the DB Request for Proposals (RFP) (Blanchard 2007 , Dwyre et 84 al. 2010 . One school of thought maintains that the more information that is provided, the more 85 likely it is that the design-builder can submit a competitive proposal because the contingencies 86 for geotechnical risk contained in the price proposal can be reduced (Christensen and Therefore, managing geotechnical risk in DB projects is both important and timely. Given the 97 high level of potential risk, there are public agencies that have sought and found contractual 98 approaches to both manage and mitigate subsurface construction risk. As such, this paper will 99 report how three public transportation agencies successfully leveraged the DB delivery process 100 itself to address geotechnical uncertainty and resolve specific geotechnical issues. 101
METHODOLOGY 102
Case study research is best used to conduct an in-depth look at promising procurement processes 103 such as DB (Eisenhardt 1991) . Case studies help find the details of the "how and why" aspects 104 for the project of interest. This is especially true for studies that examine a number of different 105 cases (Yin 2008 ). The research team developed a defensible, repeatable methodology to direct 106 the case study process. A variety of research methods were used, including multiple sources of 107 information, maintaining a chain of evidence, and searching for patterns among the data through 108 data coding (Taylor et al. 2009 , Yin 2008 . In-depth case study research was essential in this 109 The DB solicitation documents were also reviewed during the interview to ensure that their 126 meaning was fully understood by the research team. After the structured interviews, each agency 127 was furnished a copy of the draft case study reports and asked to verify the accuracy of the 128 information contained in it. The case study details provided in the paper flow directly from the 129 
Case Study Selection and Demographics 132
Three case studies were selected for inclusion in this paper to highlight specific geotechnical 133 issues that were addressed by using DB project delivery. It should be noted that they are a 134 portion of a larger study which included a total of seven projects (Gransberg and Loulakis 2011) . 135
The case studies represent a cross section of variations in geotechnical uncertainty. The 136 approaches may be generalized to other contracts or circumstances to address geotechnical 137 uncertainty. The following ranges were considered when selecting the case studies found in this 138 The three cases shown in Table 1 were specifically selected because the agency used DB as a 147 contractual tool to address geotechnical risk, whereas the other four cases in the larger study 148 merely reported the outcomes when differing site conditions were encountered. In others words, 149
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CASE STUDY DETAILS AND ANALYSIS 157
The objective of this section is to portray the breadth and depth of the case study project 158 population and analyze how DB project delivery was an effective means to provide geotechnical 159 solutions and manage risk for transportation agencies. The format has been standardized for each 160 project to enable each project to be compared with all other projects in the sample (Taylor et al. type. This was developed using preliminary geotechnical data obtained from a boring 183 program with a spacing of roughly one boring every 1,000 ft. Because the design-builder 184 had authority to vary the alignment, this particular data set could easily be off the final 185 alignment. Table 2 provides a summary of the GBR used to quantify the subsurface 186 material properties risk. 187 for work where it is not possible to calculate the exact quantity of materials that will be 260 required" (Schexnayder and Mayo 2006) . In a lump sum contract, the design-builder bears 261 the entire quantity risk. Unit pricing for specific features of work inside a lump sum DB 262 The Honolulu project also anticipated the potential for differing site conditions claims, but 331 instead of adding post-award contractual approaches to address it like the previous two cases, it 332 chose to invest in a more thorough subsurface investigation that resulted in a GBR, which was 333 included in the DB RFP. It also allowed the DB contractor to vary the alignment within the 334 project limits based on post-award investigations that would be made by the successful DB team. 335
The result was a rare amount of detailed information coupled with the explicit authority to 336 deviate from the planned alignment to avoid subsurface conditions that might threaten the 337 integrity of the contractor's proposed lump sum price. The fact that the project was awarded at a 338 level of 15% below the engineer's estimate is testimony to the success of this contractual 339 approach to managing geotechnical risk during the pre-award phase of DB procurement. The U-Link project is an example of an agency that recognized the need for geotechnical risk 360 management, but in spite of making a valiant effort to develop a mechanism to share it, was 361 unable to create an approach that filled the need and in the final analysis, one must infer that the 362 project was not a good candidate for DB project delivery. This inference is borne out by the fact 363 that portions of the project was eventually completed in 2013 using General Contractor/ 364 Construction Manager (GC/CM) (Sound 2015). GC/CM (also known as CMGC or CM-at-Risk) 365 a project delivery method where the contractor participates in the preconstruction design and 366 planning but is not responsible for the completion of the final design. Additionally, the final 367 construction cost is negotiated rather that competitively bid, which allows the agency to literally 368 negotiate the risk allocation with the contractor before fixing the price (West et al. 2012) . 369
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

